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Abstract
Cooperation between different data owners may lead to an improvement in forecast quality – for instance
by benefiting from spatial-temporal dependencies in geographically distributed time series. Due to business
competitive factors and personal data protection questions, said data owners might be unwilling to share
their data, which increases the interest in collaborative privacy-preserving forecasting. This paper analy-
ses the state-of-the-art and unveils several shortcomings of existing methods in guaranteeing data privacy
when employing Vector Autoregressive (VAR) models. The paper also provides mathematical proofs and
numerical analysis to evaluate existing privacy-preserving methods, dividing them into three groups: data
transformation, secure multi-party computations, and decomposition methods. The analysis shows that
state-of-the-art techniques have limitations in preserving data privacy, such as a trade-off between privacy
and forecasting accuracy, while the original data in iterative model fitting processes, in which intermediate
results are shared, can be inferred after some iterations.
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1. Introduction
The progress of the internet-of-things (IoT) and big data technologies is fostering a disruptive evolution
in the development of innovative data analytics methods and algorithms. This also yields ideal conditions for
data-driven services (from descriptive to prescriptive analysis), in which the accessibility to large volumes of
data is a fundamental requirement. In this sense, the combination of data from different owners can provide
valuable information for end-users and increase their competitiveness.
In order to combine data coming from different sources, several statistical approaches have emerged.
For example, in time series collaborative forecasting, the Vector Autoregressive (VAR) model has been
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widely used to forecast variables that may have different data owners. In the energy sector, the VAR
model is deemed appropriate to update very short-term forecasts (e.g., from 15 minutes to 6 hours ahead)
with recent data, thus taking advantage of geographically distributed data collected from sensors (e.g.,
anemometer, pyranometer) and/or wind turbines and solar power inverters (Tastu et al., 2013; Bessa et al.,
2015a). The VAR model can also be used in short-term electricity price forecasting (Ziel & Weron, 2018).
Furthermore, the large number of potential data owners favors the estimation of the VAR model’s coefficients
by applying distributed optimization algorithms. The Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM)
is a widely used convex optimization technique; see Boyd et al. (2011). The combination of the VAR model
and ADMM can be used jointly for collaborative forecasting (Cavalcante et al., 2017), which consists of
collecting and combining information from diverse owners. The collaborative forecasting methods require
sharing data or coefficients, depending on the structure of the data, and may or may not be focused on data
privacy. This process is also called federated learning (Yang et al., 2019).
Some other examples of collaborative forecasting include: (a) forecasting and inventory control in
supply chains, in which the benefits of various types of information-sharing options are investigated (Aviv,
2003, 2007); (b) forecasting traffic flow data (i.e. speeds) among different locations (Ravi & Al-Deek, 2009);
(c) forecasting retail prices of a specific product at every outlet by using historical retail prices of the
product at a target outlet and at competing outlets (Ahmad et al., 2016). The VAR model is the simplest
collaborative model but, conceptually, a collaborative forecasting model for time series does not need to be a
VAR. Furthermore, it is possible to extend the VAR model to include exogenous information (see Nicholson
et al. (2017) for more details) and to model non-linear relationships with past values (e.g. Li & Genton
(2009) extend the additive model structure to a multivariate setting).
Setting aside the significant potential of the VAR model for collaborative forecasting, the concerns with
the privacy of personal and commercially sensitive data comprise a critical barrier and require privacy-
preserving algorithmic solutions for estimating the coefficients of the model.
A confidentiality breach occurs when third parties recover the data provided in confidence without
consent. The leaking of a single record from the dataset may have a different impact according to the nature
of the data. For example, in medical data where each record represents a different patient, it could lead
to the disclosure of all the details about said patient. On the other hand, concerning renewable energy
generation time series, knowing that 30 MWh was produced in a given hour does not provide very relevant
information to a competitor. Hereafter, the term confidentiality breach designates the reconstruction of the
entire dataset by another party.
These concerns with data confidentiality motivated the research to handle confidential data in methods
such as linear regression and classification problems (Du et al., 2004), ridge linear regression (Karr et al.,
2009), logistic regression (Wu et al., 2012), survival analysis (Lu et al., 2015), aggregated statistics for time
series data (Jia et al., 2014), etc. Aggregated statistics consist of aggregating a set of time series data
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through a specific function, such as the average (e.g., average amount of daily exercise) sum, minimum
or maximum. However, certain literature approaches identified confidentiality breaches, showing that the
statistical methods developed to protect data privacy should be analyzed to confirm their robustness and that
additional research may be required to address overlooked limitations (Fienberg et al., 2009). Furthermore,
the application of these methodologies to the VAR model needs to be carefully analyzed, since the target
variables are the time series of each data owner, and the covariates are the lags of the same time series,
meaning that both target and covariates share a large proportion of values.
The simplest solution would be having the data owners agreeing on a commonly trusted entity (or a
central node), capable of gathering private data, solving the associated model’s fitting problem on behalf of
the data owners, and then returning the results (Pinson, 2016). However, in many cases, the data owners
are unwilling to share their data even with a trusted central node. This has also motivated the development
of data markets to monetize data and promote data sharing (Agarwal et al., 2018), which can be driven by
blockchain and smart contracts technology (Kurtulmus & Daniel, 2018).
Another possibility would be to apply differential privacy mechanisms, which consist in adding properly
calibrated noise to an algorithm (e.g., adding noise to the coefficients estimated during each iteration of the
fitting procedure) or to the data itself. Differential privacy is not an algorithm, but a rigorous definition of
privacy that is useful for quantifying and bounding privacy loss (i.e., how much original data a party can
recover when receiving data protected with added noise) (Dwork & Smith, 2009). It requires computations
insensitive to changes in any particular record or intermediate computations, thereby restricting data leaks
through the results – this is elaborated in Appendix A. While computationally efficient and popular, these
techniques invariably degrade the predictive performance of the model (Yang et al., 2019) and are not very
effective, as this paper shows.
The present paper conducts a review of the state-of-the-art in statistical methods for collaborative
forecasting with privacy-preserving approaches. This work is not restricted to a simple overview of the
existing methods and it performs a critical evaluation of said methods, from a mathematical and numerical
point of view, namely when applied to the VAR model. The major contribution to the literature is to
show gaps and downsides of current methods and to present insights for further improvements towards fully
privacy-preserving VAR forecasting methods.
In this work, we analyze the existing state-of-the-art privacy-preserving techniques, dividing them into
the following groups:
• Data transformation methods: each data owner transforms their data before the model’s fitting process,
by adding randomness to the original data in such a way that high accuracy and privacy can be achieved
at the end of the fitting process. The statistical method is independent of the transformation function
and it is applied to the transformed data.
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• Secure multi-party computation protocols: the encryption of the data occurs while fitting the statistical
model (i.e. intermediate calculations of an iterative process) and data owners are required to conjointly
compute a function over their data with protocols for secure matrix operations. A protocol consists
of a set of rules that determine how data owners must operate to determine said function. These rules
establish the calculations assigned to each data owner, what information should be shared among
them, in addition to the conditions necessary for the adequate implementation of said calculations.
• Decomposition-based methods: the optimization problem is decomposed into sub-problems allowing
each data owner to fit their model’s coefficients separately.
The remaining of the paper is organized as follows: section 2 describes the state-of-the-art for collabora-
tive forecasting with privacy-preserving; section 3 describes the VAR model as well as coefficients estimators,
and performs a critical evaluation of the state-of-the-art methods when applied to the VAR model (solar en-
ergy time series data are used in the numerical analysis). Section 4 focuses on the discussion and comparison
of the presented approaches, while the conclusions are presented in section 5.
2. Privacy-preserving Approaches
For notation purposes, vectors and matrices are denoted by bold small and capital letters, e.g. a and A,
respectively. The vector a = [a1, . . . , ak]
> represents a column vector with k dimension, where ai are scalars,
i = 1, . . . , k. The column-wise joining of vectors and matrices is indicated by [a,b] and [A,B], respectively.
Furthermore, Z ∈ RT×M is the covariate matrix and Y ∈ RT×N is the target matrix, considering n
data owners. The values T , M and N are the number of records, covariates and target variables, respec-
tively. When considering collaborative forecasting models, different divisions of the data may be considered.
Figure 1 shows the most common one, i.e.
1. Data split by records: the data owners, represented as Ai, i = 1, . . . , n, observe the same features
for different groups of samples, e.g. different timestamps in the case of time series. Z is split into
ZrAi ∈ RTAi×M and Y into YrAi ∈ RTAi×N , such that
∑n
i=1 TAi = T ;
2. Data split by features: the data owners observe different features of the same records. Z = [ZA1 , . . . ,ZAn ],
Y = [YA1 , . . . ,YAn ], such that ZAi ∈ RT×MAi , YAi ∈ RT×NAi , with
∑n
i=1MAi = M and
∑n
i=1NAi =
N ;
This section summarizes state-of-the-art approaches to deal with privacy-preserving collaborative fore-
casting methods. Section 2.1 describes the methods that ensure confidentiality by transforming the data.
Section 2.2 presents and analyzes the secure multi-party protocols. Section 2.3 describes the decomposition-
based methods.
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Figure 1: Common data division structures.
2.1. Data Transformation Methods
Data transformation methods use operator T to transform the data matrix X into X˜ = T (X). Then,
the problem is solved in the transformed domain. A common method of masking sensitive data is adding
or multiplying it by perturbation matrices. In additive randomization, random noise is added to the data
in order to mask the values of records. Consequently, the more masked the data becomes, the more secure
it will be, as long as the differential privacy definition is respected (see Appendix A). However, the use of
randomized data implies the deterioration of the estimated statistical models, and the estimated coefficients
of said data should be close to the estimated coefficients after using original data (Zhou et al., 2009).
Concerning multiplicative randomization, it enables changing the dimensions of the data by multiplying
it by random perturbation matrices. If the perturbation matrix W ∈ Rk×m multiplies the original data
X ∈ Rm×n on the left (pre-multiplication), i.e. WX, then it is possible to change the number of records;
otherwise, if W ∈ Rn×s multiplies X ∈ Rm×n on the right (post-multiplication), i.e. XW, it is possible to
modify the number of features. Hence, it is possible to change both dimensions by applying both pre and
post-multiplication by perturbation matrices.
2.1.1. Single Data Owner
The use of linear algebra to mask the data is a common practice in recent outsourcing approaches, in
which a data owner resorts to the cloud to fit their model’s coefficients, without sharing confidential data.
For example, in Ma et al. (2017) the coefficients that optimize the linear regression model
y = Xβ + ε , (1)
with covariate matrix X ∈ Rm×n, target variable y ∈ Rn, coefficient vector β ∈ Rn and error vector ε ∈ Rn,
are estimated through the regularized least squares estimate for the ridge linear regression, with penalization
term λ > 0,
βˆridge = (X
>X + λI)−1X>y. (2)
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In order to compute βˆridge via a cloud server, the authors consider that
βˆridge = A
−1b , (3)
where A = (X>X + λI)−1 and b = X>y, A ∈ Rn×n, b ∈ Rn. Then, the masked matrices MAN and
M(b + Ar) are sent to the server which computes
βˆ
′
= (MAN)−1(M(b + Ar)) , (4)
where M, N, and r are randomly generated matrices, M,N ∈ Rn×n, r ∈ Rn. Finally, the data owner
receives βˆ
′
and recovers the original coefficients by computing βˆridge = Nβˆ
′ − r.
Data normalization is also a data transformation approach that masks data by transforming the original
features into a new range through the use of a mathematical function. There are many methods for data
normalization, the most important ones being z-score and min-max normalization (Jain & Bhandare, 2011),
which are useful when the actual minimum and maximum values of the features are unknown. However, in
many applications, these values are either known or publicly available, and normalized values still encompass
commercially valuable information.
As to time series data, other approaches for data randomization make use of the Fourier and wavelet
transforms. The Fourier transform allows representing periodic time series as a linear combination of sinu-
soidal components (sine and cosine). In Papadimitriou et al. (2007), each data owner generates a noise time
series by: (i) adding Gaussian noise to relevant coefficients, or (ii) disrupting each sinusoidal component by
randomly changing its magnitude and phase. Similarly, the wavelet transform represents the time series as a
combination of functions (e.g. the Mexican hat or the Poisson wavelets), and randomness can be introduced
by adding random noise to the coefficients (Papadimitriou et al., 2007). However, there are no privacy
guarantees since noise does not respect any formal definition such as differential privacy.
2.1.2. Multiple Data Owners
The task of masking data is even more challenging when dealing with different data owners, since it is
crucial to ensure that the transformations that data owners make to their data preserve the real relationship
between the variables or the time series.
Usually, for generalized linear models (linear regression model, logistic regression model, among others),
where n data owners observe the same features, i.e. data is split by records as illustrated in Figure 1,
each data owner Ai, i = 1, ..., n, can individually multiply their covariate matrix Z
r
Ai
∈ RTAi×M and target
variable YrAi ∈ RTAi×N by a random matrix MAi ∈ Rk×TAi (with a jointly defined k value), providing
MAiZ
r
Ai
,MAiY
r
Ai
to the competitors (Mangasarian, 2012; Yu et al., 2008), which allows pre-multiplying
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the original data
Zr =

ZrA1
...
ZrAn
 and Yr =

YrA1
...
YrAn

by M = [MA1 , . . . ,MAn ], since
MZr = MA1Z
r
A1 + · · ·+ MAnZrAn . (5)
The same holds for the multiplication MYr, M ∈ Rk×
∑n
i=1 TAi ,Zr ∈ R
∑n
i=1 TAi×M ,Yr ∈ R
∑n
i=1 TAi×N .
This definition of M is possible because when multiplying M and Zr, the j-th column of M only multiplies
the j-th row of Zr. For some statistical learning algorithms, a property of such matrix is the orthogonality,
i.e. M−1 = M>. Model fitting is then performed with this new representation of the data, which preserves
the solution to the problem. This is true in the linear regression model because the multivariate least squares
estimate for the linear regression model with covariate matrix MZr and target variable MYr is
BˆLS =
(
(Zr)>Zr
)−1 (
(Zr)>Yr
)
, (6)
which is also the multivariate least squares estimate for the coefficients of a linear regression considering
data matrices Zr and Yr, respectively. Despite this property, the application in LASSO regression does
not guarantee that the sparsity of the coefficients is preserved and a careful analysis is necessary to ensure
the correct estimation of the model (Zhou et al., 2009). Liu et al. (2008) discuss attacks based on prior
knowledge, in which a curious data owner estimates M by knowing a small collection of original data
records. Furthermore, when considering the linear regression model for which Z = [ZA1 , . . . ,ZAn ] and Y =
[YA1 , . . . ,YAn ], i.e. data is split by features, it is not possible to define a matrix M
∗ = [M∗A1 , . . . ,M
∗
An ] ∈
Rk×T and then privately compute M∗Z and M∗Y, because as explained, the j-th column of M∗ multiplies
the j-th row of Z, which, in this case, consists of data coming from different owners.
Similarly, if the data owners observe different features, a linear programming problem can be solved in
a way that each individual data owner multiplies their data XAi ∈ RT×MAi by a private random matrix
NAi ∈ RMAi×s (with a jointly defined value s) and, then, shares XAiNAi (Mangasarian, 2011), i = 1, ..., n,
which is equivalent to post-multiplying the original dataset X = [XA1 , ...,XAn ] by N = [N
>
A1
, . . . ,N>An ]
>,
which represents the joining of NAi , i = 1, . . . , n, through row-wise operation. However, the obtained solution
is in a different space, and it needs to be recovered by multiplying it by the corresponding NAi , i = 1, ..., n.
For the linear regression, which models the relationship between the covariates Z ∈ RT×M and the target
Y ∈ RT×N , this algorithm corresponds to solving a linear regression that models the relationship between
ZNz and YNy, i.e.
Bˆ′LS = argmin
B
(
1
2
‖YNy − ZNzB‖22
)
, (7)
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where ZNz and YNy are shared matrices. Two private matrices Nz ∈ RM×s, Ny ∈ RN×w are required
to transform the data, since the number of columns for Z and Y is different (s and w values are jointly
defined). The problem is that the multivariate least squares estimate for (7) is
Bˆ′LS =
(
(ZNz)
>(ZNz)
)−1(
(ZNz)
>(YNy)
)
= (Nz)
−1 (Z>Z)−1Z>Y︸ ︷︷ ︸
= argminB
(
1
2‖Y − ZB‖22
)Ny , (8)
which implies that this transformation does not preserve the coefficients of the linear regression considering
data matrices Z and Y, respectively, and therefore Nz and Ny would have to be shared.
Generally, data transformation is performed through the generation of random matrices that pre or
post-multiply the private data. However, there are other techniques through which data is transformed
with matrices defined according to the data itself, as is the case with Principal Component Analysis (PCA).
PCA is a widely used statistical procedure for reducing the dimension of data, by applying an orthogonal
transformation that retains as much of the data variance as possible. Considering the matrix W ∈ RM×M of
the eigenvectors of the covariance matrix Z>Z, Z ∈ RT×M , PCA allows representing the data by L variables
performing ZNL, where NL are the first L columns of W, L = 1, ..., s. For the data split by records, Dwork
et al. (2014) suggest a differential private PCA, assuming that each data owner takes a random sample of
the fitting records to form the covariate matrix. In order to protect the covariance matrix, one can add
Gaussian noise to this matrix (determined without sensible data sharing), leading to the computation of
the principal directions of the noisy covariance matrix. To finalize the process, the data owners multiply
the sensible data by said principal directions before feeding it into the model fitting. Nevertheless, the
application to collaborative linear regression with data split by features would require sharing the data
when computing the Z>Z matrix, since Z> is divided by rows. Furthermore, as explained in (7) and (8),
it is difficult to recover the original linear regression model by performing the estimation of the coefficients
using transformed covariates and target matrices, through post-multiplication by random matrices.
Regarding the data normalization techniques mentioned above, Zhu et al. (2015) assume that data owners
mask their data by using z-score normalization, followed by the sum of random noise (from Uniform or
Gaussian distributions), allowing a greater control on their data, which is then shared with a recommendation
system that fits the model. However, the noise does not meet the differential privacy definition (see Appendix
A).
For data collected by different sensors (e.g., smart meters and mobile users) it is common to proceed to
the aggregation of data through privacy-preserving techniques. For instance, by adding carefully calibrated
Laplacian noise to each time series (Fan & Xiong, 2014; Soria-Comas et al., 2017). The addition of noise to
the data is an appealing technique given its easy application. However, even if this noise meets the definition
of differential privacy, there is no guarantee that the resulting model will perform well.
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2.2. Secure Multi-party Computation Protocols
In secure multi-party computation, the intermediate calculations required by the fitting algorithms, which
require data owners to jointly compute a function over their data, are performed through protocols for secure
operations, such as matrix addition or multiplication (discussed in section 2.2.1). In these approaches, the
encryption of the data occurs while fitting the model (discussed in section 2.2.2), instead of as a pre-
processing step such as in the data transformation methods from the previous section.
2.2.1. Linear Algebra-based Protocols
The simplest secure multi-party computation protocols are based on linear algebra and address the
problems where matrix operations with confidential data are necessary. Du et al. (2004) propose secure
protocols for product A.C and inverse of the sum (A + C)−1, for any two private matrices A and C with
appropriate dimensions. The aim is to fit a (ridge) linear regression between two data owners, who observe
different covariates but share the target variable. Essentially, the A.C protocol transforms the product of
matrices, A ∈ Rm×s, C ∈ Rs×k, into a sum of matrices, Va+Vc, which are equally secret, Va,Vc ∈ Rm×k.
However, since the estimate of the coefficients for linear regression with covariate matrix Z∈ RT×M and
target matrix Y∈ RT×N is
BˆLS = (Z
>Z)−1Z>Y , (9)
the A.C protocol is used to perform the computation of Va,Vc such that
Va + Vc = (Z
>Z) , (10)
which requires the definition of an (A + C)−1 protocol to compute
(Z>Z)−1 = (Va + Vc)−1. (11)
For the A.C protocol, A ∈ Rm×s, C ∈ Rs×k, there are two different formulations, according to the
existence, or not, of a third entity. In cases where only two data owners perform the protocol, a random
matrix M ∈ Rs×s is jointly generated and the A.C protocol achieves the following results, by dividing the
M and M−1 into two matrices with the same dimensions
AC = AMM−1C = A[Mleft,Mright]
 (M−1)top
(M−1)bottom
C (12)
= AMleft(M
−1)topC + AMright(M−1)bottomC, (13)
where Mleft and Mright represent the left and right part of M, and (M
−1)top and (M−1)bottom designate
the top and bottom part of M−1, respectively. In this case,
Va = AMleft(M
−1)topC (14)
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is derived by the first data owner, and
Vc = AMright(M
−1)bottomC (15)
by the second one. Otherwise, a third entity is assumed to generate random matrices Ra, ra and Rc, rc,
such that
ra + rc = RaRc , (16)
which are sent to the first and second data owners, respectively, Ra ∈ Rm×s, Rc ∈ Rs×k, ra, rc ∈ Rm×k. In
this case, the data owners start by trading the matrices A + Ra and C + Rc, then the second data owner
randomly generates a matrix Vc and sends
T = (A + Ra)C + (rc −Vc) (17)
to the first data owner, in such a way that, at the end of the A.C protocol, the first data owner keeps the
information
Va = T + ra −Ra(C + Rc) (18)
and the second keeps Vc (since the sum of Va with Vc is AC).
Finally, the (A + C)−1 protocol considers two steps, where A,C ∈ Rm×k. Initially, the matrix (A + C)
is jointly converted to P(A + C)Q using two random matrices, P and Q, which are only known to the second
data owner to prevent the first one from learning matrix C, P ∈ Rr×m,Q ∈ Rk×t. The results of P(A + C)Q
are known only by the first data owner who can conduct the inverse computation Q−1(A + C)−1P−1. In
the following step, the data owners jointly remove Q−1 and P−1 and get (A + C)−1. Both steps can be
achieved by applying the A.C protocol. Although these protocols prove to be an efficient technique to solve
problems with a shared target variable, one cannot say the same when Y is private, as further elaborated
in subsection 3.3.2.
Another example of secure protocols for producing private matrices can be found in Karr et al. (2009);
they are applied to data from multiple owners who observe different covariates and target features – which
are also assumed to be secret. The proposed protocol allows two data owners, with correspondent data
matrix A and C, A ∈ Rm×k, C ∈ Rm×s, to perform the multiplication A>C by: (i) first data owner
generates W = [w1, ....,wg], W ∈ Rm×g, such that
w>i Aj = 0 , (19)
where Aj is the j-th column of A matrix, i = 1, ..., g and j = 1, ..., k, and then sends W to the second owner;
(ii) the second data owner computes (I−WW>)C and shares it, and (iii) the first data owner performs
A>(I−WW>)C= A>C− A>WW>C︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0, since A>W=0
= A>C , (20)
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without the possibility of recovering C, since the rank((I−WW>)C) = m− g. To generate W, Karr et al.
(2009) suggest selecting g columns from the Q matrix, computed by QR decomposition of the private matrix
C, and excluding the first k columns. Furthermore, the authors define the optimal value for g according to
the number of linearly independent equations (represented by NLIE) on the other data owner’s data. The
second data owner obtains A>C (providing ks values, since A>C ∈ Rk×s) and receives W, knowing that
A>W = 0 (which contains kg values), i.e.
NLIE(Owner#1) = ks+ kg. (21)
Similarly, the first data owner receives A>C (providing ks values) and (I−WW>)C (providing s(m− g)
values since (I−WW>)C ∈ Rm×s and rank(W) = m− g), i.e.
NLIE(Owner#2) = ks+ s(m− g). (22)
Karr et al. (2009) determines the optimal value for g by assuming that both data owners equally share
NLIE, so that none of the agents benefit from the order assumed when running the protocol, i.e.
|NLIE(Owner#1)− LP(Owner#2)| = 0, (23)
which allows to obtain the optimal value g∗ = smk+s .
An advantage to this approach, when compared to the one proposed by Du et al. (2004), is that W
is simply generated by the first data owner, while the invertible matrix M proposed by Du et al. (2004)
needs to be agreed upon by both parties, which entails substantial communication costs when the number
of records is high.
2.2.2. Homomorphic Cryptography-based Protocols
The use of homomorphic encryption was successfully introduced in model fitting and it works by en-
crypting the original values in such a way that the application of arithmetic operations in the public space
does not compromise the encryption. Homomorphic encryption ensures that, after the decryption stage
(in the private space), the resulting values correspond to the ones obtained by operating on the original
data. Consequently, homomorphic encryption is especially responsive and engaging to privacy-preserving
applications. As an example, the Paillier homomorphic encryption scheme defines that (i) two integer values
encrypted with the same public key may be multiplied together to give encryption of the sum of the values,
and (ii) an encrypted value may be taken to some power, yielding encryption of the product of the values.
Hall et al. (2011) proposed a secure protocol for summing and multiplying real numbers by extending the
Paillier encryption, aiming to perform matrix products required to solve linear regression, for data divided
by features or records.
Equally based in Paillier encryption, the work of Nikolaenko et al. (2013) introduces two parties that
correctly perform their tasks without teaming up to discover private data: a crypto-service provider (i.e., a
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party that provides software or hardware-based encryption and decryption services) and an evaluator (i.e.,
a party who runs the learning algorithm), in order to perform a secure linear regression for data split by
records. Similarly, Chen et al. (2018) use Paillier and ElGamal encryptions to fit the coefficients of ridge
linear regression, also including these entities. In both works, the use of the crypto-service provider is
prompted by assuming that the evaluator does not corrupt its computation in producing an incorrect result.
Two conditions are required to ensure that there will be no confidentiality breaches: the crypto-service
provider must publish the system keys correctly, and there can be no collusion between the evaluator and
the crypto-service provider. The data could be reconstructed if the crypto-service provider supplies correct
keys to a curious evaluator. For data divided by features, the work of Gasco´n et al. (2017) extends the
approach of Nikolaenko et al. (2013) by designing a secure multi/two-party inner product.
Jia et al. (2018) explore a privacy-preserving data classification scheme with a support vector machine,
thus ensuring that the data owners can successfully conduct data classification without exposing their learned
models to the “tester”, while the “testers” keep their data private. For example, a hospital (owner) can create
a model to learn the relation between a set of features and the existence of a disease, and another hospital
(tester) can use this model to obtain a forecasting value, without any knowledge about the model. The
method is supported by cryptography-based protocols for secure computation of multivariate polynomial
functions but, unfortunately, this only works for data split by records.
Li & Cao (2012) addresses the privacy-preserving computation of the sum and the minimum of multiple
time series collected by different data owners, by combining homomorphic encryption and a novel key man-
agement technique to support large data dimensions. These statistics with a privacy-preserving solution
for individual user data are quite useful to explore mobile sensing in different applications such as environ-
mental monitoring (e.g., average level of air pollution in an area), traffic monitoring (e.g., highest moving
speed during rush hour), healthcare (e.g., number of users infected by a flu), etc. Liu et al. (2018) and
Li et al. (2018) explored similar approaches, based on Paillier or ElGamal encryption, namely concerning
the application in smart grids. However, the estimation of models such as the linear regression model also
requires protocols for the secure product of matrices.
Homomorphic cryptography was further explored to solve secure linear programming problems through
intermediate steps of the simplex method, which optimizes the problem by using slack variables, tableaus,
and pivot variables (de Hoogh, 2012). The author observed that the proposed protocols are still unviable to
solve linear programming problems, having numerous variables and constraints, which are quite reasonable
in practice.
Aono et al. (2017) perform a combination of homomorphic cryptography with differential privacy, in order
to deal with data split by records. Summarily, if data is split by records, as illustrated in Figure 1, each
i-th data owner observes the covariates ZrAi and target variable Y
r
Ai
, ZrAi ∈ RTAi×M ,YrAi ∈ RTAi×N , i =
1, ..., n. Then (ZrAi)
>ZrAi and (Z
r
Ai
)>YrAi are computed and Laplacian noise is added to them. This
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information is encrypted and sent to the cloud server, which works on the encrypted domain, summing all
the matrices received. Finally, the server provides the result of this sum to a client who decrypts it and
obtains relevant information to perform the linear regression, i.e.
∑n
i=1(Z
r
Ai
)>ZrAi ,
∑n
i=1(Z
r
Ai
)>YrAi , etc.
However, noise addition can result in a poor estimation of the coefficients, limiting the performance of the
model. Furthermore, this is not valid when data is divided by features, because Z>Z 6= ∑ni=1 Z>AiZAi and
Z>Y 6= ∑ni=1 Z>AiYAi .
In summary, the cryptography-based methods are usually robust to confidentiality breaches but may
require a third party for keys generation, as well as external entities to perform the computations in the
encrypted domain. Furthermore, the high computational complexity is a challenge when dealing with real
applications (de Hoogh, 2012; Zhao et al., 2019; Tran & Hu, 2019).
2.3. Decomposition-based Methods
In decomposition-based methods, problems are solved by breaking them up into smaller sub-problems and
solving each separately, either in parallel or in sequence. Consequently, private data is naturally distributed
between the data owners. However, this natural division requires sharing of intermediate information. For
that reason, some approaches combine decomposition-based methods with data transformation or homo-
morphic cryptography-based methods; but in this paper’s case, a special emphasis will be given to these
methods in separate.
2.3.1. ADMM Method
The ADMM is a powerful algorithm that circumvents problems without a closed-form solution, such as
the LASSO regression, and it has proved to be efficient and well suited for distributed convex optimization,
in particular for large-scale statistical problems (Boyd et al., 2011). Let E be a convex forecast error
function, between the true values Y and the forecasted values given by the model Yˆ = f(B,Z) using a
set of covariates Z and coefficients B, and R a convex regularization function. The ADMM method (Boyd
et al., 2011) solves the optimization problem
argmin
B
E(B) +R(B) (24)
by splitting B into two variables (B and H),
argmin
B,H
E(B) +R(H) subject to AB + CH = D (25)
and using the corresponding augmented Lagrangian function formulated with dual variable U,
L(B,H,U) = E(B) +R(H) + U>(AB+CH−D) + ρ
2
‖AB + CH−D‖22. (26)
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The quadratic term ρ2‖AB + CH−D‖22 provides theoretical convergence guarantees because it is strongly
convex. This implies mild assumptions on the objective function. Even if the original objective function is
convex, augmented Lagrangian is strictly convex (in some cases strongly convex) (Boyd et al., 2011).
The ADMM solution is estimated by the following iterative system,
Bk+1 := argmin
B
L(B,Hk,Uk)
Hk+1 := argmin
H
L(Bk+1,H,Uk)
Uk+1 := Uk + ρ(ABk+1 + CHk+1 −D).
(27)
For data split by records, the consensus problem splits primal variables B and separately optimizes
the decomposable cost function E(B) =
∑n
i=1Ei(BAi) for all the data owners under the global consensus
constraints. Considering that the sub-matrix ZrAi ∈ RTAi×M of Z ∈ RT×M corresponds to the local data of
the i−th data owner, the coefficients BAi ∈ RM×N are solved by
argmin
B,H
∑
i
Ei(BAi) +R(H) s. t. BAi −H = 0. (28)
In this case, Ei(BAi) measures the error between the true values Y
r
Ai
and the forecasted values given by
the model YˆAi = f(BAi ,Z
r
Ai
).
For data split by features, the sharing problem splits Z into ZAi ∈ RT×MAi , and B into BAi ∈ RMAi×N .
Auxiliary HAi ∈ RT×N are introduced for the i-th data owner based on ZAi and BAi . In such case,
the sharing problem is formulated based on the decomposable cost function E(B) = E(
∑n
i=1 BAi) and
R(B) =
∑n
i=1R(BAi). Then, BAi are solved by
argmin
B,H
E(
∑
i
HAi) +
∑
i
R(BAi) s.t. ZAiBAi −HAi = 0. (29)
In this case, E(
∑n
i=1 HAi) is related to the error between the true values Y and the forecasted values given
by the model Yˆ =
∑n
i=1 f(BAi ,ZAi).
Undeniably, ADMM provides a desirable formulation for parallel computing (Dai et al., 2018). However,
it is not possible to ensure continuous privacy, since ADMM requires intermediate calculations, allowing the
most curious competitors to recover the data at the end of some iterations by solving non-linear equation
systems (Bessa et al., 2018). An ADMM-based distributed LASSO algorithm, in which each data owner
only communicates with its neighbor to protect data privacy, is described in Mateos et al. (2010), with
applications in signal processing and wireless communications. Unfortunately, this approach is only valid
for the cases where data is distributed by records.
The concept of differential privacy was also explored in ADMM by introducing randomization when com-
puting the primal variables, i.e. during the iterative process, each data owner estimates the corresponding
coefficients and perturbs them by adding random noise (Zhang & Zhu, 2017). However, these local random-
ization mechanisms can result in a non-convergent algorithm with poor performance even under moderate
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privacy guarantees. To address these concerns, Huang et al. (2018) use an approximate augmented La-
grangian function and Gaussian mechanisms with time-varying variance. Nevertheless, noise addition is not
enough to guarantee privacy, as a competitor can potentially use the results from all iterations to perform
inference (Zhang et al., 2018).
(Zhang et al., 2019) have recently combined a variant of ADMM with homomorphic encryption namely
in cases where data is divided by records. As referred by the authors, the incorporation of the proposed
mechanism in decentralized optimization under data divided by features is quite difficult. Whereas the
algorithm for data split by records the algorithm only requires sharing the coefficients, the exchange of
coefficients in data split by features is not enough, since each data owner observes different features. The
division by features requires the local estimation of Bk+1Ai ∈ RMAi×N by using information related to ZAjBkAj ,
and Y, meaning that, for each new iteration, an i−th data owner shares TN new values, instead of MAiN
(from BkAi), i, j = 1, ..., n.
For data split by features, Zhang & Wang (2018) propose a probabilistic forecasting method combining
ridge linear quantile regression and ADMM. The output is a set of quantiles instead of a unique value (usually
the expected value). In this case, the ADMM is applied to split the corresponding optimization problem into
sub-problems, which are solved by each data owner, assuming that all the data owners communicate with
a central node in an iterative process, providing intermediate results instead of private data. In fact, the
authors claimed that the paper describes how wind power probabilistic forecasting with off-site information
could be achieved in a privacy-preserving and distributed fashion. However, the authors did not conduct an
in-depth analysis of the method, as will be shown in section 3. Furthermore, this method assumes that the
central node knows the target matrix.
2.3.2. Newton-Raphson Method
ADMM is becoming a standard technique in recent research about distributed computing in statistical
learning, but it is not the only one. For generalized linear models, the distributed optimization for model’s
fitting has been efficiently achieved through the Newton-Raphson method, which minimizes a twice differ-
entiable forecast error function E, between the true values Y and the forecasted values given by the model
Yˆ = f(B,Z) using a set of covariates Z, including lags of Y,
Bk+1 = Bk − (∇2E(Bk))−1∇E(Bk) , (30)
where ∇E and ∇2E are the gradient and Hessian of E, respectively. In order to enable distributed opti-
mization, ∇E and ∇2E are required to be decomposable over multiple data owners, i.e. these functions can
be rewritten as the sum of functions that depend exclusively on local data from each data owner. Slavkovic
et al. (2007) proposes a secure logistic regression approach for data split by records and features by using
secure multi-party computation protocols during the Newton-Raphson method iterations. However, and
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although distributed computing is feasible, there is no sufficient guarantee of data privacy, because it is an
iterative process; even though an iteration cannot reveal private information, sufficient iterations can: in
a logistic regression with data split by features, for each iteration k the data owners exchange the matrix
ZAiB
k
Ai
, making it possible to recover the local data ZAi at the end of some iterations (Fienberg et al.,
2009).
An example of an earlier promising work – combining logistic regression with the Newton-Raphson
method for data distributed by records – was the Grid binary LOgistic REgression (GLORE) framework (Wu
et al., 2012). The GLORE model is based on model sharing instead of patient-level data, which has motivated
subsequent improvements, some of which continue to suffer from confidentiality breaches on intermediate
results and other ones resorting to protocols for matrix addition and multiplication. Later, Li et al. (2015)
explored the issue concerning Newton-Raphson over data distributed by features, considering the existence
of a server – that receives the transformed data and computes the intermediate results, returning them to
each data owner. In order to avoid the disclosure of local data while obtaining an accurate global solution,
the authors apply the kernel trick to obtain the global linear matrix, computed using dot products of local
records (ZAiZ
>
Ai
), which can be used to solve the dual problem for logistic regression. However, the authors
identified a technical challenge in scaling up the model when the sample size is large, since each record
requires a parameter.
2.3.3. Gradient-Descent Methods
Different gradient-descent methods have also been explored, aiming to minimize a forecast error function
E, between the true values Y and the forecasted values given by the model Yˆ = f(B,Z) using a set of
covariates Z, including lags of Y. The coefficient matrix B is updated iteratively such that for the iteration
k,
Bk = Bk−1 + η∇E(Bk−1), (31)
where η is the learning rate; it allows the parallel computation when the optimization function E is decom-
posable. A common error function is the multivariate least squared error,
E(B) =
1
2
‖Y − f(B,Z)‖2. (32)
With certain properties, convergence to a certain global minima can be guaranteed (Nesterov, 1998): (i) E
is convex, (ii) ∇E is Lipschitz continuous with constant L, i.e. for any F, G,
‖∇E(F)−∇E(G)‖2 ≤ L‖F−G‖2, (33)
and (iii) η ≤ 1/L.
Han et al. (2010) proposed a privacy-preserving linear regression for data distributed over features
(with shared Y) by combining distributed gradient-descent with secure protocols, based on pre or post-
16
multiplication of the data through the random generating of private matrices. In the work of Song et al.
(2013), differential privacy is introduced by adding random noise W in the B updates,
Bk = Bk−1 + η
(
∇E(Bk−1) + W
)
. (34)
The authors investigated the effects in the obtained solutions and concluded that, in many cases, the
performance of differentially private SGD was close to that of non-private SGD, especially with larger batch
sizes (which refers to the number of fitting records used at each iteration of the algorithm). However,
differential privacy methods usually involve a trade-off between accuracy and privacy (Yang et al., 2019).
3. Collaborative Forecasting with VAR: Privacy Analysis
This section presents a privacy analysis focused on the VAR model, which is a popular model for mul-
tivariate time series analysis and collaborative forecasting. It is not only used for forecasting tasks in
different domains (and with significant improvements over univariate autoregressive models), but also for
structural inference where the main objective is exploring certain assumptions about the causal structure
of the data (Toda & Phillips, 1993). A variant with the Least Absolute Shrinkage and Selection Operator
(LASSO) regularization is also covered. The critical evaluation of the methods described in section 2 is
conducted from a mathematical and numerical point of view in section 3.3. The solar energy time series
dataset and R scripts are published in the online appendages to this paper (see Appendix B).
3.1. VAR Model Formulation
Let {yt}Tt=1 be an n-dimensional multivariate time series, where n is the number of data owners. Then,
{yt}Tt=1 follows a VAR model with p lags, represented as VARn(p), when the following relationship holds
yt = η +
p∑
`=1
yt−`B(`) + εt , (35)
for t = 1, . . . , T , where η = [η1, . . . , ηn]
> is the constant intercept (row) vector, η ∈ Rn; B(`) represents
the coefficient matrix at lag ` = 1, ..., p, B(`) ∈ Rn×n, and the coefficient associated with lag ` of time
series i (to estimate time series j) is positioned at (i, j) of B(`), for i, j = 1, ..., n; and εt = [ε1,t, . . . , εn,t]
>,
εt ∈ Rn, indicates a white noise vector that is independent and identically distributed with mean zero and
nonsingular covariance matrix. By simplification, yt is assumed to follow a centered process, η = 0, i.e., as
a vector of zeros of appropriate dimension. A compact representation of a VARn(p) model reads as
Y = ZB + E , (36)
where
Y =

y1
...
yT
 , B =

B(1)
...
B(p)
 , Z =

z1
...
zT
 , and E =

ε1
...
εT

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. . .
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ZrA1
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. . .
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Splitting across records
Splitting across features
VARn(p)

y1,t . . . yn,t
y1,t+1 . . . yn,t+1
y1,t+2 . . . yn,t+2
...
. . .
...
y1,t+h . . . yn,t+h
 =

y1,t−1 . . . yn,t−1 . . . y1,t−p . . . yn,t−p
y1,t . . . yn,t . . . y1,t−p+1 . . . yn,t−p+1
y1,t+1 . . . yn,t+1 . . . y1,t−p+2 . . . yn,t−p+2
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
. . .
...
y1,t+h−1 . . . yn,t+h−1 . . . y1,t+h−p . . . yn,t+h−p


B
(1)
1,1 . . .B
(1)
1,n
...
. . .
...
B
(1)
n,1 . . .B
(1)
n,n
...
. . .
...
B
(p)
1,1 . . .B
(p)
1,n
...
. . .
...
B
(p)
n,1 . . .B
(p)
n,n

+

ε1,t . . . εn,t
ε1,t+1 . . . εn,t+1
ε1,t+2 . . . εn,t+2
...
. . .
...
ε1,t+h . . . εn,t+h

...
Figure 2: Common data division structures and VAR model.
are obtained by joining the vectors row-wise, and defining, respectively, the T × n response matrix, the
np × n coefficient matrix, the T × np covariate matrix and the T × n error matrix, with zt = [yt−1, . . . ,
yt−p].
Notice that the VAR formulation adopted in this paper is not the usual Y> = B>Z> + E> because a
large proportion of the literature in privacy-preserving techniques derives from the standard linear regression
problem, in which each row is a record and each column is a feature.
Notwithstanding the high potential of the VAR model for collaborative forecasting, namely by linearly
combining time series from the different data owners, data privacy or confidentiality issues might hinder
this approach. For instance, renewable energy companies, competing in the same electricity market, will
never share their electrical energy production data, even if this leads to a forecast error improvement in all
individual forecasts.
For classical linear regression models, there are several techniques for estimating coefficients without
sharing private information. However, in the VAR model, the data is divided by features (Figure 2) and
the variables to be forecasted are also covariates, which is challenging for privacy-preserving techniques
(especially because it is also necessary to protect the data matrix Y, as illustrated in Figure 3). In the
remaining of the paper, YAi ∈ RT×1 and ZAi ∈ RT×p represent the target and covariate matrix for the i-th
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Y of i-th data owner︷ ︸︸ ︷ covariates values of i-th data owner︷ ︸︸ ︷
yi,t yi,t−1 yi,t−2 yt−3,i . . . yi,t−p+1 yi,t−p
yi,t+1 yi,t yi,t−1 yt−2,i . . . yi,t−p+2 yi,t−p+1
yi,t+2 yi,t+1 yi,t yt−1,i . . . yi,t−p+3 yi,t−p+2
...
...
...
...
...
...
...
yi,t+h yi,t+h−1 yi,t+h−2 yt+h−3,i . . . yi,t+h−p+1 yi,t+h−p
Figure 3: Illustration of the data used by the i-th data owner when fitting a VAR model.
data owner, respectively, when defining a VAR model. Therefore, the covariates and target matrices are
obtained by joining the individual matrices column-wise, i.e. Z = [ZA1 , . . . ,ZAn ] and Y = [YA1 , . . . ,YAn ].
For distributed computation, the coefficient matrix of data owner i is denoted by BAi ∈ Rp×n, i = 1, . . . , n.
3.2. Estimation in VAR Models
Commonly, when the number of covariates included, np, is substantially smaller than the length of the
time series, T , the VAR model can be fitted using multivariate least squares,
BˆLS = argmin
B
(‖Y − ZB‖22) , (37)
where ‖.‖r represents both vector and matrix Lr norms. However, in collaborative forecasting, as the
number of data owners increases, as well as the number of lags, it becomes crucial to use regularization
techniques, such as LASSO, in order to introduce sparsity into the coefficient matrix estimated by the
model. In the standard LASSO-VAR approach (see Nicholson et al. (2017) for different variants of the
LASSO regularization in the VAR model), the coefficients are estimated by
Bˆ = argmin
B
(
1
2
‖Y − ZB‖22 + λ‖B‖1
)
, (38)
where λ > 0 is a scalar penalty parameter.
With the addition of the LASSO regularization term, the objective function in (38) becomes non-
differentiable, thus limiting the variety of optimization techniques that can be employed. In this domain,
ADMM (which was described in 2.3.1) is a widespread and computationally efficient technique that enables
the parallel estimation for data divided by features. The ADMM formulation of the non-differentiable cost
function associated to LASSO-VAR model in (38) is obtained by solving the problem
argmin
B
(1
2
‖Y − ZB‖22 + λ‖H‖1
)
subject to H = B, (39)
which differs from (38) by splitting B into two parts (B and H). This allows splitting the objective
function in two distinct objective functions, f(B) = 12‖Y − ZB‖22 and g(H) = λ‖H‖1. The augmented
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Lagrangian (Boyd et al., 2011) of this problem is
Lρ(B,H,W) =
1
2
‖Y − ZB‖22 + λ‖H‖1 + W>(B−H) +
ρ
2
‖B−H‖22, (40)
where W is the dual variable and ρ > 0 is the penalty parameter. The scaled form of this Lagrangian is
Lρ(B,H,U) =
1
2
‖Y − ZB‖22 + λ‖H‖1 +
ρ
2
‖B−H + U‖2 − ρ
2
‖U‖2, (41)
where U = (1/ρ)W is the scaled dual variable associated with the constrain B = H. The last term is
ignored since it is a constant term with no relevance when dealing with minimization. Hence, the ADMM
formulation for LASSO-VAR consists in the following iterations (Cavalcante et al., 2017),
Bk+1 := argmin
B
(1
2
‖Y − ZB‖22 +
ρ
2
‖B−Hk + Uk‖22
)
Hk+1 := argmin
H
(
λ‖H‖1 + ρ
2
‖Bk+1 −H + Uk‖22
)
Uk+1 := Uk + Bk+1 −Hk+1.
(42)
Concerning the LASSO-VAR model, and since data is naturally divided by features (i.e. Y = [YA1 , . . . ,YAn ],
Z = [ZA1 , . . . ,ZAn ] and B = [B
>
A1
, . . . ,B>An ]
>) and the functions ‖Y − ZB‖22 and ‖B‖1 are decomposable
(i.e. ‖Y − ZB‖22 = ‖Y −
∑n
i=1 ZAiBAi‖22 and ‖B‖1 =
∑n
i=1 ‖BAi‖1), the model fitting problem (38)
becomes
Bˆ = argmin
B
(
1
2
‖Y −
n∑
i=1
ZAiBAi‖22 + λ
n∑
i=1
‖BAi‖1
)
, (43)
which is re-written as
Bˆ, Hˆ = argmin
B,H
(
1
2
‖Y −
n∑
i=1
HAi‖22 + λ
n∑
i=1
‖BAi‖1
)
subject to BAiZAi = HAi , i = 1, . . . , n, (44)
while the corresponding distributed ADMM formulation (Boyd et al., 2011; Cavalcante et al., 2017) is the
one presented in the system of equations (45),
Bk+1Ai = argmin
BAi
(ρ
2
‖ZAiBkAi + H
k − ZBk −Uk − ZAiBAi‖22 + λ‖BAi‖1
)
, (45a)
H
k+1
=
1
N + ρ
(
Y + ρZB
k+1
+ ρUk
)
, (45b)
Uk+1 = Uk + ZB
k+1 −Hk+1, (45c)
where ZB
k+1
= 1n
∑n
j=1 ZAjB
k+1
Aj
and Bk+1Ai ∈ Rp×n, ZAi ∈ RT×p,Y ∈ RT×n, H
k
,U ∈ RT×n, i = 1, ..., n.
Although the parallel computation is an appealing property for the design of a privacy-preserving ap-
proach, ADMM is an iterative optimization process that requires intermediate calculations, thus a careful
analysis is necessary to evaluate if some confidentiality breaches can occur at the end of some iterations.
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Figure 4: Transpose of the coefficient matrix used to generate the VAR with 10 data owners and 3 lags.
3.3. Privacy Analysis
3.3.1. Data Transformation with Noise Addition
This section focuses on the empirical verification of the impact of adding noise is empirically verified
using synthetic and real data (i.e., solar power time series). The impact of the data distortion into the model
forecasting skill is also quantified.
a) Synthetic Data: An experiment has been performed to add random noise from the Gaussian distribu-
tion with zero mean and variance b2, Laplace distribution with zero mean and scale parameter b and Uniform
distribution with support [−b, b], represented by N (0, b2), L(0, b) and U(−b, b), respectively. Synthetic data
generated by VAR processes are used to measure the differences between the coefficients’ values when adding
noise to the data. The simplest case considers a VAR with two data owners and two lags described by
(
y1,t y2,t
)
=
(
y1,t−1 y2,t−1 y1,t−2 y2,t−2
)

0.5 0.3
0.3 0.75
−0.3 −0.05
−0.1 −0.4
+
(
ε1,t ε2,t
)
.
The second case includes ten data owners and three lags, introducing a high percentage of null coefficients
(≈ 86%), with Figure 4 illustrating the considered coefficients. Since a specific configuration can generate
various distinct trajectories, 100 simulations are performed for each specified VAR model, each of them
with 20,000 records. For both simulated datasets, the errors ε were assumed to follow a multivariate
Normal distribution with a zero mean vector and a covariance matrix equal to the identity matrix of
appropriate dimensions. Distributed ADMM (detailed in section 2.3.1) was used to estimate the LASSO-
VAR coefficients, considering two different noise characterizations, b ∈ {0.2, 0.6}.
Figure 5 summarizes the mean and the standard deviation of the absolute difference between the real
and estimated coefficients, for both VAR processes, from 100 simulations. The greater the noise b, the
greater the distortion of the estimated coefficients. Moreover, the Laplace distribution, which has desirable
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Figure 5: Mean and standard deviation of the absolute difference between the real and estimated coefficients (left: VAR with
2 data owners, right: VAR with 10 data owners).
properties to make the data private according to the differential privacy framework, registers the greater
distortion in the estimated model.
Using the original data, the ADMM solution tends to stabilize after 50 iterations, and the value of
the coefficients is correctly estimated (the difference is approximately zero). Regarding the distorted time
series, it converges faster, but the coefficients deviate from the real ones. In fact, adding noise contributes
to decreasing the absolute value of the coefficients, i.e. the relationships between the time series become
weakened.
These experiments allow drawing some conclusions about the use of differential privacy. The Laplace
distribution has advantageous properties, since it ensures ε-differential privacy when random noise follows
L(0, ∆f1ε ). For the VAR with two data owners, ∆f1 ≈ 12 since the observed values are in the interval [−6, 6].
Therefore, ε = 20 when L(0, 0.6) and ε = 15 when L(0, 0.8), meaning that the data still encompass much
relevant information. Finally, to verify the impact of noise addition into forecasting performance, Figure 6
illustrates the improvement of each estimated VAR2(2) model (with and without noise addition) over the
Autoregressive (AR) model estimated with original time series, in which collaboration is not used. This
improvement is measured in terms of Mean Absolute Error (MAE) and Root Mean Squared Error (RMSE)
values. Concerning the case with ten data owners, and when using data without noise, seven data owners
improve their forecasting performance, which was expected from the coefficient matrix in Figure 4. When
Laplacian noise is applied to the data, only one data owner (the first one) improves its forecasting skill (when
compared to the AR model) by using the estimated VAR model. Even though the masked data continues
to provide relevant information, the model obtained for the Laplacian noise performs worse than the AR
model for the second data owner, making the VAR useless for the majority of the data owners.
However, the results cannot be generalized for all VAR models, especially regarding the illustrated
VAR10(3), which is very close to the AR(3) model. Given that, a third experiment is proposed, in which 200
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Figure 6: Improvement (%) of VAR2(2) model over AR(2) model, in terms of MAE and RMSE for synthetic data.
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Figure 7: Improvement (%) of VAR model over AR model, in terms of MAE and RMSE for synthetic data.
random coefficient matrices are generated for a stationary VAR2(2) and VAR10(3) following the algorithm
proposed by Ansley & Kohn (1986). Usually, the generated coefficient matrix has no null entries and the
higher values are not necessarily found on diagonals. Figure 7 illustrates the improvement for each data
owner when using a VAR model (with and without noise addition) over the AR model. In this case, the
percentage of times the AR model performs better than the VAR model with distorted data is smaller, but
the degradation of the models is still noticeable, especially in relation to the case with 10 data owners.
b) Real Data: The real dataset encompasses hourly time series of solar power generation from 44 micro-
generation units located in E´vora city (Portugal), covering the period from February 1, 2011 to March 6,
2013. As in Cavalcante & Bessa (2017), records corresponding to a solar zenith angle higher than 90◦ were
removed, in order to take off nighttime hours (i.e., hours without any generation). Furthermore, and to
make the time series stationary, a normalization of the solar power was applied by using a clear-sky model
(see Bacher et al. (2009)) that gives an estimate of the solar power in clear sky conditions at any given time.
The power generation for the next hour is modeled through the VAR model, which combines data from 44
data owners and considers 3 non-consecutive lags (1, 2 and 24h). Figure 8 (a) summarizes the improvement
for the 44 PV power plants over the autoregressive model, in terms of MAE and RMSE. The quartile 25%
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Figure 8: Results for real case-study with solar power time series.
allows concluding that MAE improves at least 10% for 33 of the 44 PV power plants, when data owners
share their observed data. As to RMSE the improvement is not so significant, but is still greater than zero.
Although the data obtained after Laplacian noise addition keeps its temporal dependency, as illustrated in
Figure 8 (b), the corresponding VAR model is useless for 4 of the 44 data owners. When considering RMSE,
2 of the 44 data owners obtain better results by using an autoregressive model. Once again, the resulting
model suffers a significant reduction in terms of forecasting capability.
3.3.2. Linear Algebra-based Protocols
As mentioned in the introduction of section 2.2.1, the work of Du et al. (2004) proposes protocols for
secure matrix multiplication for the situations where two data owners observe the same common target
variable and different confidential covariates. Unfortunately, this protocol fails when applied to the VAR
model in which a large proportion of the covariate matrix is determined by knowing the target variables,
which are also undisclosed.
In order to verify this limitation, let us consider the case with two data owners without a third entity
generating random matrices. Using the notation of section 3.1, both data owners are assumed to use the
same number of lags p to fit a linear regression, which corresponds to a VARp(2) model, with a total of T
records. ZAi ∈ RT×p and YAi ∈ RT×1 are, respectively, the covariates and target matrices observed by i-th
data owner, i = 1, 2. Since the multivariate least squares estimate for the linear regression with covariates
Z = [ZA1 ,ZA2 ] and target Y = [YA1 ,YA2 ] is
BˆLS =
 Z>A1
Z>A2
 [ZA1 ,ZA2 ]
−1 Z>A1
Z>A2
 [YA1 ,YA2 ]
 (46)
=
 Z>A1ZA1 Z>A1ZA2
Z>A2ZA1 Z
>
A2
ZA2
−1 Z>A1YA1 Z>A1YA2
Z>A2YA1 Z
>
A2
YA2
 , (47)
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the data owners need to jointly compute Z>A1ZA2 , Z
>
A1
YA2 and Z
>
A2
YA1 . In order to compute Z
>
A1
ZA2
both data owners define a matrix M ∈ RT×T and compute its inverse M−1. Then, data owners share
Z>A1Mleft ∈ Rp×T/2 and (M−1)topZA2 ∈ RT/2×p, respectively, aiming to compute the matrices in (14)
and (15). This implies that each data owner shares pT/2 values.
Similarly, the computation of Z>A1YA2 implies that data owners define a matrix M
∗, and share Z>A1M
∗
left ∈
Rp×T/2 and (M∗−1)topYA2 ∈ RT/2×p, respectively, providing new pT/2 values. This means that Owner#2
receives Z>A1Mleft and Z
>
A1
M∗left, i.e. Tp values, and may recover ZA1 which consists of Tp values, represent-
ing a confidentiality breach. Furthermore, when considering a VAR model with p lags, ZA1 has T + p − 1
unique values, meaning less values to recover. Similarly, Owner#1 may recover ZA2 from Owner#2 through
the matrices shared for the computation of Z>A1ZA2 and Z
>
A2
YA1 .
Lastly, when considering a VAR with p lags, YAi only has p values that are not in ZAi . Since both data
owners will obtain their coefficients BAi ∈ Rp×n, sufficient information is provided to recover YAi .
The main disadvantage of the linear algebra-based methods is that they do not take into account that, in
the VAR model, both target variables and covariates are private and that a large proportion of the covariates
matrix is determined by knowing the target variables. This means that the data shared between data owners
may be enough for competitors to be able to reconstruct the original data. For the method proposed by Karr
et al. (2009), a consequence of such data is that the assumption rank
(
(I−WW>)C) = m− g may not be
enough to protect the data.
3.3.3. ADMM Method and Central Node
The work of Zhang & Wang (2018) appears to be a promising approach for dealing with the problem
of private data during the ADMM iterative process described by (45). Based on Zhang & Wang (2018),
for each iteration k, each data owner i communicates their local results, ZAiB
k+1
Ai
, to the central node,
ZAi ∈ RT×p,Bk+1Ai ∈ Rp×n, i = 1, . . . , n. Then, the central node computes the intermediate matrices in
(45b)-(45c) and returns the matrix H
k − ZBk − Uk to each data owner, in order to update BAi in the
next iteration, as seen in (45a). Figure 9 illustrates the methodology for the LASSO-VAR with three data
owners. In this solution, there is no direct exchange of private data. However, as presented next, not only
can the central node recover the original data, but also individual data owners can obtain a good estimation
of the data used by the competitors. To simplify, let us assume an optimistic scenario: no repeated values in
YAi and ZAi , since if the T records are consecutive, as well as the p lags, then Y = [YA1 , . . . ,YAn ]∈ RT×n
and Z = [ZA1 , . . . ,ZAn ]∈ RT×np has Tn+ np unique values instead of Tn+ Tnp.
Central node data recovering. Using the notation of section 3.1, each of the n data owners is assumed
to use the same number of lags p to fit an LASSO-VAR model with a total number of T records (keep in
mind that T > np, otherwise there will be more coefficients to be determined than system equations). At
the end of k iterations, the central node receives a total of Tnk values from each data owner i, corresponding
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Figure 9: Distributed ADMM LASSO-VAR with a central node and 3 data owners (related to the algorithm in (45)).
to ZAiB
1
Ai
,ZAiB
2
Ai
, ...,ZAiB
k
Ai
∈ RT×n, and does not know pnk+Tp, corresponding to B1Ai , ...,BkAi∈ Rp×n
and ZAi∈ RT×p, respectively, i = 1, ..., n. Given that, the solution of the inequality
Tnk ≥ pnk + Tp, (48)
in k, allows to infer that a confidentiality breach can occur at the end of
k =
⌈
Tp
Tn− pn
⌉
(49)
iterations, where dxe denotes the ceiling function. Since T tends to be large, k tends to dp/ne, which may
represent a confidentiality breach if the number of iterations required for the algorithm to converge is greater
than dp/ne.
Owners’ data recovering. Without loss of generality, Owner #1 is considered the semi-trusted data
owner – a semi-trusted data owner completes and shares his/her computations faithfully, but tries to learn
additional information while or after the algorithm runs. For each iteration k, this data owner receives the
intermediate matrix H
k− ZBk︸︷︷︸
= 1n
∑n
i=1 ZAiB
k
Ai
−Uk∈ RT×n, which provides Tn values. However, Owner #1 does
not know
−Uk + Hk︸ ︷︷ ︸
∈RT×n
, BkA2 , . . . ,B
k
An︸ ︷︷ ︸
n− 1 matrices ∈ Rp×n
, ZA2 , . . . ,ZAn︸ ︷︷ ︸
n− 1 matrices ∈ RT×p
, YA2 , . . . ,YAn︸ ︷︷ ︸
n− 1 matrices ∈ RT×1
,
which corresponds to Tn + (n − 1)pn + (n − 1)Tp + (n − 1)T values. However, since all the data owners
know that H
k
and Uk are defined by the expressions in (45b) and (45c), it is possible to perform some
simplifications in which Uk and H
k − ZBk −Uk becomes (50) and (51), respectively,
Uk
(45c)
= Uk−1 + ZB
k −Hk = Uk−1 + ZBk − 1
N + ρ
(
Y + ρZB
k
+ ρUk−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
= H
k
, according to (45b)
=
[
1− ρ
N + ρ
]
Uk−1 +
[
1− ρ
N + ρ
]
ZB
k − 1
N + ρ
Y ,
(50)
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H
k−ZBk−Uk= 1
N + ρ
(
Y + ρZB
k
+ ρUk−1
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
=H
k
, according to (45b)
−ZBk −Uk.
(51)
Therefore, the iterative process to find the competitors’ data proceeds as follows:
1. Initialization: The central node generates U0 ∈ RT×n, and the i-th data owner generates B1Ai ∈ Rp×n,
i ∈ {1, ..., n}.
2. Iteration #1: The central node receives ZAiB
1
Ai
and computes U1, returning H
1−ZB1−U1 ∈ RT×n
which is returned for all n data owners. At this point, Owner #1 receives Tn values and does not
know
U0︸︷︷︸
∈RT×n
, B1A2 , ...,B
1
An︸ ︷︷ ︸
n− 1 matrices ∈ Rp×n
, ZA2 , ...,ZAn︸ ︷︷ ︸
n− 1 matrices ∈ RT×p
and n−1 columns of Y ∈ RT×n, corresponding to Tn+ (n− 1)[pn+ Tp+ T ] values.
3. Iteration #2: The central node receives ZAiB
2
Ai
and computes U2, returning H
2 −ZB2 −U2 for the
n data owners. At this point, only new estimations for the vectors BA2 , ...,BAn were introduced in
the system, which means more (n−1)pn values to estimate.
As a result, at the end of k iterations, Owner #1 has received ZAiB
1
Ai
, . . . ,ZAiB
k
Ai
∈ RT×n corresponding
to Tnk values and needs to estimate
U0︸︷︷︸
∈RT×n
,B1A2 , ...,B
1
An ,B
2
A2 , ...,B
2
An , . . . ,B
k
A2 , ...,B
k
An︸ ︷︷ ︸
(n− 1)k matrices ∈ Rp×n
, ZA2 , ...,ZAn︸ ︷︷ ︸
n− 1 matrices ∈ RT×p
and n−1 columns of Y ∈ RT×n, corresponding to Tn+ (n− 1)[kpn+ Tp+ T ]. Then, the solution for the
inequality
Tnk ≥ Tn+ (n− 1)[kpn+ Tp+ T ] (52)
allows to infer that a confidentiality breach may occur at the end of
k =
⌈
Tn+ (n− 1)(Tp+ T )
Tn− (n− 1)pn
⌉
(53)
iterations. Figure 10 illustrates the k value for different combinations of T , n, and p. In general, the greater
the number of records T , the smaller the number of iterations necessary for confidentiality breach. That is
because more information is shared during each iteration of the ADMM algorithm. On the other hand, the
number of iterations until a possible confidentiality breach increases with the number of data owners (n).
The same is true for the number of lags (p).
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Figure 10: Number of iterations until a possible confidentiality breach, considering the centralized ADMM-based algorithm
in Zhang et al. (2019).
3.3.4. ADMM Method and Noise Mechanisms
The target matrix Y = [YA1 , . . . ,YAn ] corresponds to the sum of private matrices IYAi ∈ RT×n, i.e.
y1,t y2,t . . . yn,t
y1,t+1 y2,t+1 . . . yn,t+1
y1,t+2 y2,t+2 . . . yn,t+2
...
. . .
...
y1,t+h y2,t+h . . . yn,t+h

︸ ︷︷ ︸
Y
=

y1,t 0 . . . 0
y1,t+1 0 . . . 0
y1,t+2 0 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
y1,t+h 0 . . . 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
IYA1
+

0 y2,t . . . 0
0 y1,t+1 . . . 0
0 y1,t+2 . . . 0
...
. . .
...
0 y1,t+h . . . 0

︸ ︷︷ ︸
IYA2
+ · · ·+

0 0 . . . yn,t
0 0 . . . yn,t+1
0 0 . . . yn,t+2
...
. . .
...
0 0 . . . yn,t+h

︸ ︷︷ ︸
IYAn
, (54)
where [IYAi ]i,j = 0 in cases where the entry (i, j) of Y is from i-th data owner and [IYAi ]i,j = [Y]i,j
otherwise.
Since the LASSO-VAR ADMM formulation is provided by (45), and (45c) corresponds to
H
k+1
=
1
N + ρ
[YA1 , . . . ,YAn ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=Y∈RT×n
+ρ
1
n
n∑
i=1
ZAiB
k+1
Ai︸ ︷︷ ︸
=ZB
k+1
+ρUk
 , (55)
each data owner should exchange the quantity
IYAi +
ρ
n
ZAiB
k+1
Ai
, (56)
28
where
Y + ρZB
k+1
=
n∑
i=1
IYAi +
ρ
n
ZAiB
k+1
Ai
(57)
and IYAi ∈ RT×n.
Let W1 ∈ Rp×n, W2 ∈ RT×n, W3 ∈ RT×p, represent noise matrices generated according to the
differential privacy framework. The noise mechanism could be introduced by replacing IYAi +ρZAiB
k+1
Ai
by
(i) adding noise to the estimated coefficients,
IYAi + ρZAi(B
k+1
Ai
+ W1), (58)
(ii) adding noise to the data,
(IYAi + W2) + ρ(ZAi + W3)B
k+1
Ai
, (59)
(iii) and adding noise to the intermediate matrix,
IYAi + ρZAiB
k+1
Ai
+ W2. (60)
The question is whether any of these approaches can guarantee privacy. A semi-trusted competitor can
estimate B, without distinguishing between BAi and W1 in (58), by recovering IYAi and ZAi . Following
the same reasoning mentioned in the previous section, at the end of some iterations, the semi-trusted data
owner will receive sufficient information to obtain these matrices. The second situation, (59), corresponds
to the use of a data transformation approach and, as determined before, it leads to some model performance
deterioration. Finally, when adding random noise to all the intermediate matrices, (60), semi-trusted data
owners can re-write this information as
IYAi + ρZAi [B
k+1
Ai
+ (1/ρ)Z−1Ai W2], (61)
and they can interpret the intermediate results as
IYAi + ρZAiB
′k+1
Ai
, (62)
meaning that a confidentiality breach may occur yet again.
4. Discussion
Table 1 summarizes the methods from the literature. These algorithms for the privacy-preserving ought
to be carefully built and consider two key components: (i) how data is distributed between data owners,
and (ii) the statistical model used. The decomposition-based methods are very sensitive to data partition,
while data transformation and cryptography-based methods are very sensitive to problem structure, with
the exception of the differential privacy methods, which simply add random noise, from specific probability
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Table 1: Summary of state-of-the-art privacy-preserving approaches.
Split by features Split by records
Data Transformation Mangasarian (2011) Mangasarian (2012),
Yu et al. (2008),
Dwork et al. (2014)
Secure Multi-party
Computation
Linear
Algebra
Du et al. (2004),
Karr et al. (2009),
Zhu et al. (2015),Fan
& Xiong (2014)*,
Soria-Comas et al.
(2017)
Zhu et al. (2015),
Aono et al. (2017)
Homomorphic-
cryptography
Yang et al. (2019),
Hall et al. (2011),
Gasco´n et al. (2017),
Slavkovic et al.
(2007)
Yang et al. (2019),
Hall et al. (2011),
Nikolaenko et al.
(2013),Chen et al.
(2018), Jia et al.
(2018),Slavkovic
et al. (2007)
Decomposition-based
Methods
Pure Pinson (2016),Zhang
& Wang (2018)
Wu et al. (2012),Lu
et al. (2015),Ahmadi
et al. (2010),Mateos
et al. (2010)
Linear
Algebra
Li et al. (2015),Han
et al. (2010)
Zhang & Zhu (2017),
Huang et al. (2018),
Zhang et al. (2018)
Homomorphic-
cryptography
Yang et al. (2019),
Li & Cao (2012)*,
Liu et al. (2018)*,
Li et al. (2018)*,
Fienberg et al.
(2009),Mohassel &
Zhang (2017)
Yang et al. (2019),
Zhang et al. (2019),
Fienberg et al.
(2009), Mohassel &
Zhang (2017)
* secure data aggregation.
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distributions, to the data itself. This property makes these methods appealing, but differential privacy
usually involves a trade-off between accuracy and privacy.
Cryptography-based methods are usually more effective against confidentiality breaches, but they have
some disadvantages: (i) some of them require a third-party for keys generation, as well as external entities
to perform the computations in the encrypted domain; (ii) challenges in the scalability and implementation
efficiency, which are mostly due to the high computational complexity and overhead of existing homomorphic
encryption schemes (de Hoogh, 2012; Zhao et al., 2019; Tran & Hu, 2019). Regarding some protocols, such
as secure multi-party computation through homomorphic cryptography, communication complexity grows
exponentially with the number of records (Rathore et al., 2015).
Data transformation methods do not affect the computational time for training the model, since each
data owner transforms his/her data before the model fitting process. The same is true for the decomposition-
based methods in which data is split by data owners. The secure multi-party protocols have the disadvantage
of transforming the information while fitting the statistical model, which implies a higher computational
cost.
As already mentioned, the main challenge to the application of the existent privacy-preserving algorithms
in the VAR model is the fact that Y and Z share a high percentage of values, not only during the fitting
of the statistical model but also when using it to perform forecasts. A confidentiality breach may occur
during the forecasting process if, after the model is estimated, the algorithm to maintain privacy provides
the coefficient matrix B for all data owners. When using the estimated model to perform forecasts, assuming
that each i-th data owner sends their own contribution for the time series forecasting to every other j-th
data owner:
1. In the LASSO-VAR models with one lag, since i-th data owner sends yi,t[B
(1)]i,j for j-th data owner,
the value yi,t may be directly recovered when the coefficient [B
(1)]i,j is known by all data owners,
being [B(1)]i,j the coefficient associated with lag 1 of time series i, to estimate j.
2. In the LASSO-VAR models with p consecutive lags, the forecasting of a new timestamp only requires
the introduction of one new value in the covariate matrix of the i-th data owner. In other words,
at the end of h timestamps, the j-th data owner receives the h values. However, there are h + p
values that the data owner does not know about. This may represent a confidentiality breach since
a semi-trusted data owner can assume different possibilities for the initial p values and then generate
possible trajectories.
3. In the LASSO-VAR models with p non-consecutive lags, p1, . . . , pp, at the end of pp−pp−1 timestamps,
only one new value is introduced in the covariate matrix, meaning that the model is also subject to a
confidentiality breach.
Therefore, and considering the issue of data naturally split by features, it would be more advantageous
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to apply decomposition-based methods, since the time required for model fitting is not affected by data
transformations and each data owner only has access to their own coefficients. However, with the state-
of-the-art approaches, it is difficult to guarantee that these techniques can indeed offer a robust solution
for data privacy when addressing data split by features. Finally, a remark about some specific business
applications of VAR, where data owners know exactly some past values of the competitors. For example,
consider a VAR model with lags ∆t = 1, 2 and 24, which predicts the production of solar plants. Then, when
forecasting the first sunlight hour of a day, all data owners will know that the previous lags 1 and 2 have
zero production (no sunlight). Irrespective of whether the coefficients are shared or not, a confidentiality
breach may occur. For these special cases, the estimated coefficients cannot be used for a long time horizon,
and online learning may represent an efficient alternative.
The privacy issues analyzed in this paper are not restricted to the VAR model nor to point forecasting
tasks. Probabilistic forecasts, using data from different data owners (or geographical locations), can be
generated with splines quantile regression (Tastu et al., 2013), component-wise gradient boosting (Bessa
et al., 2015b), a VAR that estimates the location parameter (mean) of data transformed by a logit-normal
distribution (Dowell & Pinson, 2015), linear quantile regression with LASSO regularization (Agoua et al.,
2018), among others. These are some examples of collaborative probabilistic forecasting methods. However,
none of them considers the confidentiality of the data. Moreover, the method proposed by Dowell & Pinson
(2015) can be influenced by the confidentiality breaches discussed thorough this paper, since the VAR model
is directly used to estimate the mean of transformed data from the different data owners. On the other hand,
when performing non-parametric models such as quantile regression, each quantile is estimated by solving an
independent optimization problem, which means that the risk of a confidentiality breach increases with the
number of quantiles being estimated. Note that quantile regression-based models may be solved through
the ADMM method (Zhang et al., 2019). However, as discussed in section 2.3, the semi-trusted agent
may collect enough information to infer the confidential data. The quantile regression method may also be
estimated by applying linear programming algorithms (Agoua et al., 2018), which may be solved through
homomorphic encryption, despite being computationally demanding for high-dimensional multivariate time
series.
5. Conclusion
This paper presents a critical overview of the literature techniques used to handle privacy issues in collab-
orative forecasting methods. In addition, it also performs an analysis to their application to the VAR model.
The aforementioned existing techniques are divided into three groups of approaches to guarantee privacy:
data transformation, secure multi-party computation and decomposition of the optimization problem into
sub-problems.
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For each group, several points can be concluded. Starting with data transformation techniques, two
remarks were made. The first one concerns the addition of random noise to the data. While the algorithm
is simple to apply, this technique demands a trade-off between privacy and the correct estimation of the
model’s parameters (Yang et al., 2019). In our experiments, there was a clear model degradation even though
the data kept its original behavior (section 3.3.1). The second relates to the multiplication by a random
matrix that is kept undisclosed. Ideally, and in what concerns data where different data owners observe
different variables, this secret matrix would post-multiply data, thus enabling each data owner to generate
a few lines of this matrix. However, as demonstrated in equation (8) of section 2.1.2, this transformation
does not preserve the coefficients of the statistical algorithm, and the reconstruction of the original model
may require sharing the matrices used to encrypt the data, thus exposing the original data.
The second group of techniques, secure multi-party computations, introduce privacy in the intermediate
computations by defining the protocols for addition and multiplication of the private datasets, without
confidentiality breaches using either linear algebra or homomorphic encryption methods. For independent
records, data confidentiality is guaranteed for (ridge) linear regression through linear algebra-based protocols;
not only do records need to be independent, but some also require that the target variable is known by all
data owners. These assumptions might prevent their application when covariates and target matrices share a
large proportion of values – in the VAR model case, for instance. This means that shared data between agents
might be enough for competitors to be able to reconstruct the data. Homomorphic cryptography methods
might result in computationally demanding techniques since each dataset value has to be encrypted. The
discussed protocols ensure privacy-preserving while using (ridge) linear regression if there are two entities
that correctly performs the protocol without agent collusion. These entities are an external server (e.g., a
cloud server) and an entity which generates the encryption keys. In some approaches, all data owners know
the coefficient matrix B at the end of the model estimation. This is a disadvantage when applying models
in which covariates include the lags of the target variable because confidentiality breaches may occur during
the forecasting phase.
Finally, the decomposition of the optimization problem into sub-problems (which can be solved in parallel)
have all the desired properties for a collaborative forecasting problem, since each data owner only estimates
their coefficients. A common assumption of such methods is that the objective function is decomposable.
However, these approaches consist in iterative processes that require sharing intermediate results for the
next update, meaning that each new iteration conveys more information about the secret datasets to the
data owners, possibly breaching data confidentiality.
In conclusion, and regarding future work, some of the limitations identified in this review will be further
addressed. Data transformation methods and decomposition-based methods could be combined, so that the
original problem could be solved in another feature space – without it altering the solution of the problem,
or in a way that the original solution could be recovered.
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Appendix A. Differential Privacy
Mathematically, a randomized mechanism A satisfies (ε,δ)-differential privacy (Dwork & Smith, 2009)
if, for every possible output t of A and for every pair of datasets D and D′ (differing in at most one record),
Pr(A(D) = t) ≤ δ + exp(ε)Pr(A(D′) = t). (A.1)
In practice, differential privacy can be achieved by adding random noise W to some desirable function f of
the data D, i.e
A(D) = f(D) +W. (A.2)
The (ε,0)-differential privacy is achieved by applying noise from Laplace distribution with scale parameter
∆f1
ε , with ∆fk = max{‖f(D) − f(D′)‖k}. A common alternative is the Gaussian distribution but, in
this case, δ > 0 and the scale parameter which allows (ε,δ)-differential privacy is σ ≥
√
2 log
(
1.25
δ
)
∆2f
ε .
Therefore, the data can be masked by considering
A(D) = D + W. (A.3)
Appendix B. Supplementary Data and Code
Supplementary material related to this article is available online. The available material includes:
• admm functions.R: R script with ADMM algorithm implementation.
• clear sky functions.R: R script to estimate clear-sky solar power generation with the model de-
scribed in Bacher et al. (2009).
• coef generator.R: R script with the functions for generating VAR model coefficients, according to
the implementation in (Virolainen, 2020).
• run experiments.R: R script with the commands for generating the results of section 3.3.1.
34
• c sky.csv: estimated clear-sky solar power generation.
• normalized PVdata.csv: normalized (with clear-sky model) solar power time series data.
• PVdata.csv: solar power time series data.
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